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Several edit probabilities and edit distances incorporating the stop/go clocking in
the well-known A5-type keystream generator are proposed. Recursive algorithms
for their efficient computation are derived. It is shown how the edit probabilities
can be used to mount statistically optimal correlation attacks on any two of the
three stop/go clocked shift registers. By using a method for estimating the underly-
ing false alarm probability, it is argued that the minimum output sequence length
required to be known for a successful attack is linear in the total length of the
respective shift registers. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
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1. INTRODUCTION
A common type of keystream generators for additive stream cipher
applications consists of a number of regularly or irregularly clocked linear
feedback shift registers (LFSRs) that are combined by a function with or
without memory. Such a generator may in principle be vulnerable to
various secret key reconstruction attacks (for a survey, see [8, 12]). Typi-
cally, the attacks require an exhaustive search over the initial states of a
subset of the LFSRs and are hence feasible only if the effective secret key
controlling these initial states is short. In some cases, faster cryptanalytic
attacks which may work for long regularly clocked LFSRs have also been
proposed.
When the combining function is applied to irregularly clocked LFSRs, it
can even be linear and memoryless. The stop-and-go (stop/go) clocking is
interesting particularly for high speed applications. At any time, a stop/go
shift register is clocked once if the clock-control input bit is equal to 1 (or
0) and is not clocked at all otherwise. The best known examples of key-
stream generators incorporating stop/go LFSRs are the stop/go cascades
[10], the alternating step generator [11], and the A5-type keystream
generator, which is considered in this paper. It consists of three binary
LFSRs with known primitive feedback polynomials that are mutually
clocked in the stop/go manner. Middle taps from each of the LFSRs are
used to produce the clock-control bits which define the stop/go clocking in
such a way that at least two LFSRs are clocked per each output bit. The
clocking can thus be described in terms of a 4-valued clock-control
sequence. The keystream sequence is formed as the bitwise sum of the three
stop/go clocked LFSR sequences. This keystream generator along with a
reinitialization scheme (where the LFSR initial states are defined in terms
of the secret session key and a so-called frame number) is (allegedly) used
under the name A5 for stream cipher encryption in the GSM standard for
digital cellular mobile telephones (see [13]).
In [2] it is argued that the period of the keystream sequence is only
slightly bigger than the period of the longest LFSR. In [6] a cryptanalytic
approach consisting of several methods for LFSR internal states recon-
struction, LFSR initial states reconstruction, and secret session key recon-
struction is proposed. The methods include the internal state reconstruction
consisting of generating and solving a specific set of linear equations, the
internal state reconstruction based on a time-memory tradeoff, and the
internal state reversion based on the theory of branching processes. The
time-memory tradeoff method is further developed in [1] for specific
parameters of the GSM version.
In this paper, divide-and-conquer correlation attacks on the A5-type
keystream generator with general parameters are investigated. Their objec-
tive is to recover the LFSR initial states from a known segment of the key-
stream sequence faster than by the exhaustive search. The correlation
attacks are based on appropriate edit probabilities and edit distances. Such
attacks are not directly applicable to the GSM version of the A5-type key-
stream generator, because of a very short available keystream sequence in
each session.
Note that edit distance and edit probability correlation attacks on
irregularly clocked shift registers, which are clocked at least once at a time,
are introduced in [3, 4], respectively. For some extensions, see [5].
Regarding the stop/go clocking, a specific edit distance correlation attack
on the alternating step generator is proposed in [7], whereas an edit prob-
ability correlation attack on this generator is proposed in [9].
The main problems considered in this paper are how to define the edit
probabilities and edit distances for the A5-type keystream generator, how
to compute them efficiently, and how to estimate the known keystream
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sequence length required for a successful correlation attack. The fact that
the first (binary) derivative of the output sequence of the A5-type key-
stream generator is bitwise correlated to the first derivative of the sum of
any two stop/go clocked LFSR sequences indicates that a divide-and-
conquer correlation attack on any two LFSRs may be possible. On the
other hand, in the probabilistic model where the regularly clocked LFSR
sequences are assumed to be independent and purely random, each stop/go
clocked LFSR sequence is statistically independent of the output sequence,
so that a correlation attack on individual LFSRs is not possible.
In Section 2, a detailed description of the A5-type keystream generator is
provided. In an approximate model where the 4-valued clock-control
sequence is assumed to be independently generated, the edit probabilities
and edit distances and the recursive algorithms for their efficient computa-
tion are presented in Section 3, whereas Section 4 contains similar concepts
and results for the related edit probability and edit distance in a more
realistic model with only one binary clock-control sequence independently
generated. A method for reducing the required space and time complexities
is explained in Section 5. The corresponding correlation attack is proposed
in Section 6. Conclusions are given in Section 7.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE A5-TYPE KEYSTREAM GENERATOR
The A5-type keystream generator considered is shown in Fig. 1. The
feedback polynomials of all three binary LFSRs are assumed to be primi-
tive, so that they produce maximum-length sequences when clocked
regularly. Let Si(t)=(si, l(t)
ri
l=1) denote the internal state of LFSRi of
length ri at time t \ 0 (Si(0) is the initial state) and let yi, yi \ 1, denote a
middle tap from LFSRi used for clock control, i=1, 2, 3. For any t \ 1,
the clock-control symbol c(t), specifying which LFSRs are clocked in
order to produce the output bit o(t), is defined by c(t)=h(s1, y1 (t−1),
s2, y2 (t−1), s3, y3 (t−1)), where h is a 4-valued majority function of three
binary variables such that h(s1, s2, s3) is equal to {i, j} if si=sj ] sk, for
i < j and k ] i, j, and to {1, 2, 3} if s1=s2=s3. More precisely, if c(t)=
{i, j}, then two LFSRs, LFSRi, and LFSRj, are clocked, and if c(t)=
{1, 2, 3}, then all three LFSRs are clocked. The binary clock-control bits
ci(t), i=1, 2, 3, are derived from c(t) by using the stop/go clocking rule: at
time t, LFSRi is clocked if ci(t)=1 and is not clocked if ci(t)=0.
The output bit is produced as the binary sum o(t)=s1, 1(t)À s2, 1(t)À s3, 1(t),
where À denotes the binary addition (modulo 2).
Under the so-called randomness assumption that the regularly clocked
LFSR sequences are independent and purely random (a sequence of inde-
pendent uniformly distributed random variables over any finite set is called
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FIG. 1. The A5-type keystream generator.
purely random), it is shown in [6] that the clock-control and output
sequences are both purely random and, moreover, that the bitwise sum of
any two stop/go clocked LFSR sequences is also purely random. This
implies that each stop/go clocked LFSR sequence is statistically indepen-
dent of the output sequence. Also, it follows that the probability distribu-
tion of the 3-bit input to the clock-control function h is uniform at any
time.
3. EDIT PROBABILITIES AND EDIT DISTANCES FOR
THE INDEPENDENT CLOCK-CONTROL STRING
Let Xn+2=x1, x2, ..., xn+2 , Yn+2=y1, y2, ..., yn+2 , and Un+2=u1, u2, ..., un+2
denote three binary input strings and let Cn+1=c1, c2, ..., cn+1 denote
a 4-valued clock-control string, where ci ¥ C, C={{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3},
{1, 2, 3}}. Let On+1=o1, o2, ..., on+1=Fn+1(Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2, Cn+1) denote
the combination string produced from Xn+2, Yn+2, and Un+2 by the A5-type
stop/go clocking according to Cn+1, where Xn+2, Yn+2, and Un+2 corre-
spond to the initial segments of regularly clocked LFSR1, LFSR2, and
LFSR3 sequences, respectively, and Cn+1 is generated independently.
More precisely, we initially have o1=x2 À y2 À u1 if c1={1, 2}, o1=
x1 À y2 À u2, if c1={2, 3}, o1=x2 À y1 À u2 if c1={1, 3}, and o1=x2 À y2
À u2 if c1={1, 2, 3}. Let wij(C s+1) denote the number of occurrences of
the symbol {i, j} in C s+1, 1 [ i < j [ 3. For simplicity, let w12(C s+1)=l1,
w23(C s+1)=l2, and w13(C s+1)=l3. The number of occurrences of the
symbol {1, 2, 3} in C s+1 is then s+1−l1−l2−l3. Then for any 0 [ s [ n,
os+1=xs+2−l2 À ys+2−l3 À us+2−l1 .
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Further, the first (binary) derivative of a binary string An+1=a1,
a2, ..., an+1 is defined as A˙n=a˙1, ..., a˙n where a˙i=ai À ai+i, 1 [ i [ n. Let
O˙n=F˙n(Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2, Cn+1) denote the first derivative of On+1. The
process of producing O˙n is called the edit transformation of Xn+2, Yn+2, and
Un+2 into O˙n according to Cn+1.
3.1. Edit Probabilities
Assume a probabilistic model where the strings Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2, and
Cn+1 are independent and purely random (for simplicity, we keep the same
notation for random variables and their values). They define a random edit
transformation of Xn+2, Yn+2, and Un+2 into O˙n.
Let Zn=z1, z2, ..., zn denote a binary output string. The edit probability
for given input strings Xn+2, Yn+2, and Un+2 and a given output string Zn is
then defined as the probability that Xn+2, Yn+2, and Un+2 are transformed
into Zn by a random edit transformation according to random Cn+1.
Formally, it is defined as the conditional probability
P(Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2; Zn)
=Pr{F˙n(Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2, Cn+1)=Zn | Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2}. (1)
It is symmetric with respect to Xn+2, Yn+2, and Un+2.
The statistically optimal edit probability (minimizing the error probabil-
ity when deciding on Xn+2, Yn+2, and Un+2 given Zn) is then given as
Pr{Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2, F˙n(Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2, Cn+1)=Zn}
=P(Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2; Zn) ·Pr{Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2}. (2)
As Pr{Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2}=2−3(n+2), the edit probability (1) is also statisti-
cally optimal.
Our objective is to examine whether the defined edit probability can be
computed efficiently by an algorithm whose computational complexity is
significantly smaller than 4n+1, which corresponds to the computation of
(1) by the summation of the elementary probability 4−(n+1) over all Cn+1
such that F˙n(Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2, Cn+1)=Zn. To this end, we define the
partial edit probability depending on the distribution of symbols in the
clock-control string.
For any 0 [ s [ n, a triple (l1, l2, l3) is said to be permissible if
0 [ l1, l2, l3 [ s+1 and l1+l2+l3 [ s+1. For a given s, the set of all the
permissible values of (l1, l2, l3) is denoted by Ls. For any 1 [ s [ n and
(l1, l2, l3) ¥Ls, the partial edit probability is defined as the conditional
joint probability
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P(l1, l2, l3, s)=Pr{F˙ s(X s+2, Y s+2, U s+2, C s+1)=Z s,
w12(C s+1)=l1, w23(C s+1)=l2,
w13(C s+1)=l3 | Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2}. (3)
If w12(C s+1)=l1, w23(C s+1)=l2, and w13(C s+1)=l3, then os+1=xs+2−l2 À
ys+2−l3 À us+2−l1 , so that the edit transformation in (3) involves the prefixes
X s+2−l2, Y s+2−l3, and U s+2−l1 only.
The next theorem enables efficient computation of the edit probability
based on a recursive property of the partial edit probability. It can be
proved by a similar method as Theorem 3 in Section 4.1.
Theorem 1. For any given Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2, and Zn, we have
P(Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2; Zn)= C
(l1, l2, l3) ¥Ln
P(l1, l2, l3, n), (4)
where the partial edit probability P(l1, l2, l3, n) is computed recursively by
P(l1, l2, l3, s)=
1
4 · (P(l1−1, l2, l3, s−1)(1 À zs À x˙s+1−l2 À y˙s+1−l3 )
+P(l1, l2−1, l3, s−1)(1 À zs À y˙s+1−l3 À u˙s+1−l1 )
+P(l1, l2, l3−1, s−1)(1 À zs À x˙s+1−l2 À u˙s+1−l1 )
+P(l1, l2, l3, s−1)(1 À zs À x˙s+1−l2 À y˙s+1−l3 À u˙s+1−l1 )}
(5)
for 1 [ s [ n and all (l1, l2, l3) ¥Ls, with the initial values P(0, 0, 0, 0)
=P(0, 0, 1, 0)=P(0, 1, 0, 0)=P(1, 0, 0, 0)=1/4. (For each 0 [ s [ n, if
(l1, l2, l3) is not permissible, then it is assumed that P(l1, l2, l3, s)=0, so that
the corresponding terms in (5) are not computed.)
The edit probability P(Xn+2, Yn+2; Zn) with respect to Xn+2 and Yn+2 as
input strings is defined by assuming that Un+2 is purely random and inde-
pendent of Cn+1. This edit probability and the corresponding partial edit
probability are defined by equations analogous to (1) and (3), respectively.
Their recursive computation is established by the following result which
can be obtained as a corollary to Theorem 1 (assume that u˙s+1−l1 in (5) is a
random variable).
Corollary 1. For any given Xn+2, Yn+2, and Zn, we have
P(Xn+2, Yn+2; Zn)= C
(l1, l2, l3) ¥Ln
P(l1, l2, l3, n), (6)
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where the partial edit probability P(l1, l2, l3, n) is computed recursively by
P(l1, l2, l3, s)=
1
4 ·P(l1−1, l2, l3, s−1)(1 À zs À x˙s+1−l2 À y˙s+1−l3 )
+18 · (P(l1, l2−1, l3, s−1)+P(l1, l2, l3−1, s−1)
+P(l1, l2, l3, s−1)) (7)
for 1 [ s [ n and all (l1, l2, l3) ¥Ls, with the same initial values as in
Theorem 1.
As both (5) and (7) effectively depend on the input strings involved,
the underlying edit probabilities have the potential to be used for
making a decision on the input strings based on a given output string.
This is not the case with the edit probability with respect to only one of
the input strings, which can be defined analogously, since the recursion
for the corresponding partial edit probability would not depend on that
input string (assume that y˙s+1− l3 in (7) is a random variable). This is in
accordance with the fact [6] that the bitwise sum of any two stop/go
clocked LFSR sequences is purely random, under the randomness
assumption.
3.2. Edit Distances
By allowing the edit transformation to include substitutions of bits in
the first derivative O˙ n of the combination string one can also define the
corresponding edit distances. Namely, the edit distance for three input
strings D(Xn+2, Y n+2, U n+2; Z n) is defined as the minimum number of
effective substitutions (complementations) in O˙ n needed to obtain a
given output string Z n, where the minimum is taken over all clock-
control strings C n+1. The edit distance for two input strings
D(X n+2, Y n+2; Z n) is defined analogously, but the minimum is then
taken over all C n+1 and U n+2. In both cases, the corresponding partial
edit distances can be computed recursively by Theorem 2 and Corollary
2 which can be proved analogously to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1,
respectively.
Theorem 2. For any given Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2, and Zn, we have
D(Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2; Zn)= min
(l1, l2, l3) ¥Ln
W(l1, l2, l3, n), (8)
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where the partial edit distanceW(l1, l2, l3, n) is computed recursively by
W(l1, l2, l3, s)=min{W(l1−1, l2, l3, s−1)+(zs À x˙s+1−l2 À y˙s+1−l3 ),
W(l1, l2−1, l3, s−1)+(zs À y˙s+1−l3 À u˙s+1−l1 ),
W(l1, l2, l3−1, s−1)+(zs À x˙s+1−l2 À u˙s+1−l1 ),
W(l1, l2, l3, s−1)+(zs À x˙s+1−l2 À y˙s+1−l3 À u˙s+1−l1 )}
(9)
for 1 [ s [ n and all (l1, l2, l3) ¥Ls, with the initial values W(0, 0, 0, 0)
=W(0, 0, 1, 0)=W(0, 1, 0, 0)=W(1, 0, 0, 0)=0. (For each 0 [ s [ n, if
(l1, l2, l3) is not permissible, then it is assumed that W(l1, l2, l3, s)=., so
that the corresponding terms in (9) are not computed.)
Corollary 2. For any given Xn+2, Yn+2, and Zn, we have
D(Xn+2, Yn+2; Zn)= min
(l1, l2, l3) ¥Ln
W(l1, l2, l3, n), (10)
where the partial edit distanceW(l1, l2, l3, n) is computed recursively by
W(l1, l2, l3, s)=min{W(l1−1, l2, l3, s−1)+(zs À x˙s+1−l2 À y˙s+1−l3 ),
W(l1, l2−1, l3, s−1), W(l1, l2, l3−1, s−1),
W(l1, l2, l3, s−1)} (11)
for 1 [ s [ n and all (l1, l2, l3) ¥Ls, with the same initial values as in
Theorem 2.
The time and space complexities of all the recursive algorithms corre-
sponding to Theorems 1 and 2 and Corollaries 1 and 2 are O(n4) and
O(n3), respectively, since only the values of the partial edit probability for
the current and the preceding value of s have to be stored at a time.
4. EDIT PROBABILITY AND EDIT DISTANCE FOR
ONE INDEPENDENT BINARY CLOCK-CONTROL STRING
In the A5-type keystream generator, instead of being independent of the
LFSR strings, the clock-control string is produced as a function of their
phase-shifted versions. A more realistic edit transformation should incor-
porate this feature. To achieve a divide-and-conquer effect, the edit trans-
formation should involve exactly two input strings, in view of the fact that
EDIT PROBABILITIES AND DISTANCES 363
just one input string cannot be recovered from the output string. This is
because the bitwise sum of any two stop/go clocked LFSR sequences is
purely random, under the randomness assumption.
Let y −i=max(yi, 2), where yi is the tap position in LFSRi used for
clock control, i=1, 2, 3. Further, for a binary string An=a1, a2, ..., an, let
Amk=ak, ak+1, ..., ak+m−1 denote a binary substring of length m, 1 [ k [
n−m+1. The combination string On+1=Fn+1(Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2, Cn+1) is
produced in the same way as in Section 3, whereas the clock-control string
Cn+1 is generated as a functionHn+1(Xn+y1y1 , Y
n+y2
y2
, Un+y3y3 ). More precisely,
we have that c1=h(xy1 , yy2 , uy3) and, using the same notation as in Section 3,
for any 0 [ s [ n, cs+2=h(xs+1+y1 − l2 , ys+1+y2 − l3 , us+1+y3 − l1 ). Altogether, we
have On+1=Gn+1(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2, Un+y
−
3).
In order to define an edit probability for two input strings that can be
computed recursively, we adopt an approximate model for the A5-type
keystream generator where instead of Un+y3y3 , an auxiliary random binary
string Rn+1 is used to produce Cn+1. Thus, the combination string On+1 is
produced as Fn+1(Xn+2, Yn+2, Un+2, Cn+1) and the clock-control string Cn+1
is generated as a function Hn+1(Xn+y1y1 , Y
n+y2
y2
, Rn+1). More precisely, c1=
h(xy1 , yy2 , r1) and for any 0 [ s [ n, cs+2=h(xs+1+y1 − l2 , ys+1+y2 − l3 , rs+2).
Altogether, we have On+1=Gn+1(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2, Un+2, Rn+1).
The process of producing the first derivative of On+1, O˙n=
G˙n(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2, Un+2, Rn+1), from given input strings Xn+y
−
1 and Yn+y
−
2
according to an input string Un+2 and an auxiliary clock-control string
Rn+1 is called the edit transformation of Xn+y
−
1 and Yn+y
−
2 into O˙n according
to Un+2 and Rn+1.
4.1. Edit Probability
Assume a probabilistic model where the strings Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2, Un+2, and
Rn+1 are independent and purely random. Note that this model of Rn+1 is
in accordance with the uniform probability distribution of the 3-bit input
to the clock-control function. Let Zn=z1, z2, ..., zn denote a binary output
string. The edit probability for given input strings Xn+y
−
1 and Yn+y
−
2 and a
given output string Zn is then defined as the probability that Xn+y
−
1 and
Yn+y
−
2 are transformed into Zn by a random edit transformation according
to random Un+2 and Rn+1. Namely, the edit probability is defined as the
conditional probability
P(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2; Zn)
=Pr{G˙n(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2, Un+2, Rn+1)=Zn | Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2}. (12)
It is symmetric with respect to Xn+y
−
1 and Yn+y
−
2 and is statistically optimal
in the assumed probabilistic model.
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For any 1 [ s [ n and (l1, l2, l3) ¥Ls, the corresponding partial edit
probability is defined as
P(l1, l2, l3, s)=Pr{O˙ s=Z s, w12(C s+1)=l1, w23(C s+1)=l2,
w13(C s+1)=l3 | Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2} (13)
where O˙s=F˙s(Xs+2, Ys+2, Us+2, Cs+1) and Cs+1=Hs+1(Xs+y1y1 , Y
s+y2
y2
, Rs+1).
Its recursive computation is established by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For any given Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2, and Zn, we have
P(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2; Zn)= C
(l1, l2, l3) ¥Ln
P(l1, l2, l3, n), (14)
where the partial edit probability P(l1, l2, l3, n) is computed recursively by
P(l1, l2, l3, s)=
1
2 ·P(l1−1, l2, l3, s−1)
· (1 À zs À x˙s+1−l2 À y˙s+1−l3 )(1 À xs+y1 − l2 À ys+y2 − l3 )
+14 · (P(l1, l2−1, l3, s−1)(xs+1+y1 − l2 À ys+y2 − l3 )
+P(l1, l2, l3−1, s−1)(xs+y1 − l2 À ys+1+y2 − l3 )
+P(l1, l2, l3, s−1)(1 À xs+y1 − l2 À ys+y2 − l3 )) (15)
for 1 [ s [ n and all (l1, l2, l3) ¥Ls, with the initial values P(0, 0, 0, 0)=
P(1, 0, 0, 0)=(1À xy1 À yy2 )/2 and P(0, 1, 0, 0)=P(0, 0, 1, 0)=(xy1 À
yy2 )/2. (For each 0 [ s [ n, if (l1, l2, l3) is not permissible, then it is assumed
that P(l1, l2, l3, s)=0, so that the corresponding terms in (15) are not
computed.)
Proof. First observe that (14) is a direct consequence of (12) and (13).
Assume that s \ 2. We partition all clock-control strings C s+1 into four
subsets with respect to the value of the last symbol cs+1. For simplicity of
notation, the conditioning on X s+y
−
1 and Y s+y
−
2 is removed from (13) and the
resulting equations. Then (13) can be put into the form
P(l1, l2, l3, s)
=Pr{o˙s=zs | O˙s−1=Zs−1, w12(Cs)=l1−1, w23(Cs)=l2, w13(Cs)=l3, cs+1={1, 2}}
·Pr{cs+1={1, 2} | O˙s−1=Zs−1, w12(Cs)=l1−1, w23(Cs)=l2, w13(Cs)=l3}
·Pr{O˙s−1=Zs−1, w12(Cs)=l1−1, w23(Cs)=l2, w13(Cs)=l3}
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+Pr{o˙s=zs | O˙s−1=Zs−1, w12(Cs)=l1, w23(Cs)=l2−1, w13(Cs)=l3, cs+1={2, 3}}
·Pr{cs+1={2, 3} | O˙s−1=Zs−1, w12(Cs)=l1, w23(Cs)=l2−1, w13(Cs)=l3}
·Pr{O˙s−1=Zs−1, w12(Cs)=l1, w23(Cs)=l2−1, w13(Cs)=l3}
+Pr{o˙s=zs | O˙s−1=Zs−1, w12(Cs)=l1, w23(Cs)=l2, w13(Cs)=l3−1, cs+1={1, 3}}
·Pr{cs+1={1, 3} | O˙s−1=Zs−1, w12(Cs)=l1, w23(Cs)=l2, w13(Cs)=l3−1}
·Pr{O˙s−1=Zs−1, w12(Cs)=l1, w23(Cs)=l2, w13(Cs)=l3−1}
+Pr{o˙s=zs | O˙s−1=Zs−1, w12(Cs)=l1, w23(Cs)=l2, w13(Cs)=l3, cs+1={1, 2, 3}}
·Pr{cs+1={1, 2, 3} | O˙s−1=Zs−1, w12(Cs)=l1, w23(Cs)=l2, w13(Cs)=l3}
·Pr{O˙s−1=Zs−1, w12(Cs)=l1, w23(Cs)=l2, w13(Cs)=l3}. (16)
The third factor in each addend of (16) is easily recognized to be the
partial edit probability appearing in the corresponding addend of (15) (use
(13) for s−1).
Now, under the condition that w12(C s)=l1, w23(C s)=l2, and w13(C s)
=l3, we obtain the following equations. If cs+1={1, 2}, then o˙s=x˙s+1−l2 À
y˙s+1−l3 and cs+1=h(xs+y1 − l2 , ys+y2 − l3 , rs+2). If cs+1={2, 3}, then o˙s=y˙s+1−l3
À u˙s+1−l1 and cs+1=h(xs+y1 − l2+1, ys+y2 − l3 , rs+1). If cs+1={1, 3}, then o˙s=
x˙s+1−l2 À u˙s+1−l1 and cs+1=h(xs+y1 − l2 , ys+y2 − l3+1, rs+1). If cs+1={1, 2, 3},
then o˙s=x˙s+1−l2 À y˙s+1−l3 À u˙s+1−l1 and cs+1=h(xs+y1 − l2 , ys+y2 − l3 , rs+1).
Consequently, we have (conditioned on X s+y
−
1 and Y s+y
−
2) that
Pr{cs+1={1, 2} | O˙ s−1=Z s−1, w12(C s)=l1−1, w23(C s)=l2, w13(C s)=l3}
=(1 À xs+y1 − l2 À ys+y2 − l3 ) ·Pr{rs+2 ] xs+y1 − l2}=(1 À xs+y1 − l2 À ys+y2 − l3 )/2
(17)
Pr{cs+1={2, 3} | O˙ s−1=Z s−1, w12(C s)=l1, w23(C s)=l2−1, w13(C s)=l3}
=(xs+1+y1 − l2 À ys+y2 − l3 ) ·Pr{rs+1=ys+y2 − l3}=(xs+1+y1 − l2 À ys+y2 − l3 )/2
(18)
Pr{cs+1={1, 3} | O˙ s−1=Z s−1, w12(C s)=l1, w23(C s)=l2, w13(C s)=l3−1}
=(xs+y1 − l2 À ys+1+y2 − l3 ) ·Pr{rs+1=xs+y1 − l2}=(xs+y1 − l2 À ys+1+y2 − l3 )/2
(19)
Pr{cs+1={1, 2, 3} | O˙ s−1=Z s−1, w12(C s)=l1, w23(C s)=l2, w13(C s)=l3}
=(1 À xs+y1 − l2 À ys+y2 − l3 ) ·Pr{rs+1=xs+y1 − l2}=(1 À xs+y1 − l2 À ys+y2 − l3 )/2.
(20)
366 GOLIC´ AND MENICOCCI
Further, we get
Pr{o˙s=zs | O˙ s−1=Z s−1, w12(C s)=l1−1, w23(C s)=l2, w13(C s)=l3, cs+1={1, 2}}
=(1 À zs À x˙s+1−l2 À y˙s+1−l3 ) (21)
Pr{o˙s=zs | O˙ s−1=Z s−1, w12(C s)=l1, w23(C s)=l2−1, w13(C s)=l3, cs+1={2, 3}}
=1/2 (22)
Pr{o˙s=zs | O˙ s−1=Z s−1, w12(C s)=l1, w23(C s)=l2, w13(C s)=l3−1, cs+1={1, 3}}
=1/2 (23)
Pr{o˙s=zs | O˙ s−1=Z s−1, w12(C s)=l1, w23(C s)=l2, w13(C s)=l3, cs+1={1, 2, 3}}
=1/2. (24)
Equation (22) follows from o˙s=y˙s+1−l3 À u˙s+1−l1 in view of the fact that
us+2−l1 remains to be independent of us+1−l1 when conditioned on O˙
s−1=
Z s−1, w12(C s)=l1, w23(C s)=l2−1, and w13(C s)=l3, as this condition
involves only U s+1−l1 (not us+2−l1 ). Equations (23) and (24) are proved
analogously.
Equation (15) is obtained from (16) by plugging in the determined
probabilities.
For s=1, the edit probability values are directly obtained from (13).
When these values are expressed in terms of the unknown initial values by
the recursion (15), a system of linear equations is formed. The initial values
are then determined by solving this system. L
Since the edit probability is exponentially small in the string length, the
following normalization turned out to be computationally convenient in
the conducted experiments: P¯(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2; Zn)=2n+1P(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2; Zn).
It corresponds to the right-hand side of (15) and the initial values being
multiplied by 2.
4.2. Edit Distance
The edit distance for two input strings D(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2; Zn) is defined as
the minimum number of effective substitutions (complementations) in O˙n
needed to obtain a given output string Zn, where the minimum is taken
over all binary strings Un+2 and Rn+1. The corresponding partial edit dis-
tance can be computed recursively by Theorem 4, which can be proved
analogously to Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. For any given Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2, and Zn, we have
D(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2; Zn)= min
(l1, l2, l3) ¥Ln
W(l1, l2, l3, n), (25)
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where the partial edit distanceW(l1, l2, l3, n) is computed recursively by
W(l1, l2, l3, s)=min{W(l1−1, l2, l3, s−1)+(zs À x˙s+1−l2 À y˙s+1−l3 )
+l(xs+y1 − l2=ys+y2 − l3 ),
W(l1, l2−1, l3, s−1)+l(xs+1+y1 − l2 ] ys+y2 − l3 ),
W(l1, l2, l3−1, s−1)+l(xs+y1 − l2 ] ys+1+y2 − l3 ),
W(l1, l2, l3, s−1)+l(xs+y1 − l2=ys+y2 − l3 )} (26)
for 1 [ s [ n and all (l1, l2, l3) ¥Ls, with the initial values W(0, 0, 0, 0)=
W(1, 0, 0, 0)=l(xy1=yy2 ) and W(0, 1, 0, 0)=W(0, 0, 1, 0)=l(xy1 ] yy2 ),
where the indicator function l(P) is equal to 0 if a predicate P is true and to
. if P is false. (For each 0 [ s [ n, if (l1, l2, l3) is not permissible, then it is
assumed that W(l1, l2, l3, s)=., so that the corresponding terms in (26) are
not computed.)
5. REDUCING THE SPACE AND TIME COMPLEXITIES
The time and space complexities of the recursive algorithms correspond-
ing to Theorems 3 and 4 are both O(n4) and O(n3), respectively.
In order to avoid slowing down the computations, the operating memory
of a computer system should be used to store the partial edit probabilities
and/or distances. In this regard, the space complexity O(n3) is prohibi-
tively high if the string length n is of the order of thousands, as could be
expected to be needed in a realistic correlation attack. We now propose a
method to reduce the space complexity for the edit probability computa-
tion to O(n3/2).
As the 4-valued clock-control string is purely random if the input
strings are independent and purely random, wij(C s) is then a binomially
distributed random variable with the expected value m(s)=s/4 and the
standard deviation s(s)=`3s/4. Accordingly, for most input strings
Xn+y
−
1 and Yn+y
−
2, the most significant values of the partial edit probability
P(l1, l2, l3, s) are concentrated around the point (l1, l2, l3) % ((s+1)/4,
(s+1)/4, (s+1)/4), while the others are considerably smaller. So, the idea
is to compute only the significant values while the others are set to zero.
More precisely, P(l1, l2, l3, s) is computed only for (l1, l2, l3) ¥Ls(M)
defined as follows. First compute r1(n)=Km(n+1)−3s(n+1)L and M
=K6s(n+1)L and set r2(n)=r1(n)+M (for large n, [r1(n), r2(n)] ı
[0, n+1]). Second, for any 1 < s [ n, compute r1(s) and r2(s) as follows. If
s+1 [M, then r1(s)=0 and r2(s)=s+1. IfM< s+1 [ 2M, then r1(s)=0
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and r2(s)=M. If s+1 > 2M, then r1(s)=K(s+1)/4−M/2L and r2(s)=
r1(s)+M. Accordingly, for any 1 [ s [ n,Ls(M) is defined as the set of all
(l1, l2, l3) such that r1(s) [ l1, l2, l3 [ r2(s) and l1+l2+l3 [ s+1.
The same recursion (15) is used for the computation, with a difference
that the involved partial probability values for the preceding value of s that
have not been computed are set to zero. The space complexity is then
O(M3)=O(n3/2), and the time complexity is reduced to O(n5/2). The same
method can be applied to the edit distance computation except that insig-
nificant partial edit distance values are set to ..
6. CORRELATION ATTACK
It is assumed that the LFSR feedback polynomials and a sufficiently
long segment of the keystream sequence, in the known plaintext scenario,
are known. The objective of cryptanalysis is to reconstruct the secret-key-
dependent LFSR initial states by a method faster than the exhaustive
search.
Under the randomness assumption, individual LFSR sequences are sta-
tistically independent of the output sequence, so that the maximum pos-
sible divide-and-conquer effect can be obtained by recovering any two
LFSR sequences from the output sequence simultaneously. As at any time
each LFSR is clocked with probability 3/4, it follows that the first deriva-
tive of the output sequence of the A5-type keystream generator is bitwise
correlated with the correlation coefficient 1/4 to the first derivative of the
sum of any two stop/go clocked LFSR sequences. This suggests that such
a divide-and-conquer correlation attack may be possible.
To this end, one can use either the edit probability for two input strings
and an independent 4-valued clock-control string (Section 3.1) or the edit
probability for two input strings and one independent binary clock-control
string (Section 4.1). Although the edit probabilities are both statistically
optimal in the respective probabilistic models, the latter one is more
informative as a measure of correlation, at a slightly increased computa-
tional cost, since the corresponding probabilistic model is more realistic.
One can as well use the corresponding edit distances, which are easier to
compute, but are not statistically optimal. For these reasons, we propose
the correlation attack based on the edit probability for one independent
binary clock-control string. In order to reduce the space complexity, the
edit probability should be modified as explained in Section 5.
The correlation attack goes on as follows. The targets are the initial
states of the shortest two LFSRs, LFSR1 and LFSR2, where it is assumed
that the LFSRs are indexed in order of increasing lengths. Suppose that the
first n bits, Zn, of the first derivative of the output sequence are given. The
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string Zn comes from unknown output strings of regularly clocked LFSR1
and LFSR2 whose lengths are random and are at most n+y
−
1 and n+y
−
2,
respectively. Then assume the initial states of LFSR1 and LFSR2 and
generate the input strings Xn+y
−
1 and Yn+y
−
2 as the first n+y −1 and n+y
−
2 bits
of the respective regularly clocked LFSR sequences. Compute the nor-
malized edit probability P¯(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2; Zn) by the recursive algorithm
derived in Section 4.1. This is repeated for every possible pair of the initial
states of LFSR1 and LFSR2, altogether 2 r1+r2 of them. Note that for the
GSM version of the A5-type keystream generator, r1=19, r2=22, and
r3=23.
Roughly speaking, the candidates for the correct initial state pair are
obtained as the ones with the computed normalized edit probability close
to being maximal. In order to treat this issue more precisely, we introduce
the following statistical model. Consider the probability distribution of the
normalized edit probability P¯(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2; Zn) in the following two cases
(hypotheses):
• H0 (correlated case). Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2, Un+2, and Rn+1 are purely random
and independent and Zn=G˙n(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2, Un+2, Rn+1).
• H 1 (independent case). Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2, and Zn are purely random and
independent.
H0 models the case when the guessed input string pair (i.e., the initial states
of LFSR1 and LFSR2) is correct, and H1 models the opposite case. Alter-
natively, the correlated case can as well (more realistically) be modeled by:
• H0 (correlated case). Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2 and Un+y
−
3 are purely random and
independent and Zn=G˙n(Xn+y
−
1, Yn+y
−
2, Un+y
−
3).
For the maximum edit probability decision rule to work, it is necessary
that the separation between the probability distributions in the correlated
and independent cases increases with the string length n, and the faster the
increase, the smaller the string length required for successful decision
making is. The separation between the two distributions is measured by the
false alarm probability (derived from H1) when the missing event probabil-
ity (derived from H 0) is fixed. Since there is only one correct input string
pair, the missing event probability can be fixed to a value which need not
be very small (e.g., pm=0.1). Therefore, in the statistical hypotheses testing
considered, a threshold is set according to pm and a tested input string pair
is classified under H 0 or H 1 depending on whether the normalized edit
probability is bigger or smaller than the threshold. In this case, the false
alarm probability pf becomes a function of n, and if and only if this func-
tion is decreasing, then the separation between the two distributions
increases with n, as desired.
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Accordingly, in the correlation attack, a threshold is set according to the
missing event probability (e.g., pm=0.1) and a tested initial state pair is
classified as a candidate if the corresponding normalized edit probability is
bigger than or equal to the threshold. This threshold can be obtained
empirically. Ideally, if n is large enough, then there will remain only one
candidate for the initial state pair. This can happen only if the false alarm
probability pf(n) is sufficiently small. Namely, as the expected number of
false candidates for an average Zn is (2 r1+r2−1) pf(n), the correlation
attack is deemed successful if and only if, approximately,
2 r1+r2pf(n) [ 1 (27)
(see [7, 9]).
If pf(n) has the exponential form abn, where b < 1, then (27) reduces to
n \
r1+r2+log2 a
− log2 b
(28)
which means that the required output segment length is essentially linear in
the total length of LFSR1 and LFSR2. Note that the corresponding key-
stream length is n+1.
For pm=0.1, the false alarm probability, as a function of the string
length n, can be estimated by computer simulations. For each n, the
threshold and the false alarm probability should be obtained on a number
(e.g., 100) of random samples generated according to H 0 and H 1, respec-
tively. In view of the experimental results from [9], we anticipate that for
large n the false alarm probability exponentially decreases as abn, b < 1.
Although the scheme analyzed in [9] is different, it is also based on
stop/go clocking. The parameters a and b can be assessed by the least
mean square approximation method applied to the logarithms to the base
two of the false alarm probability estimates. Note that the time for com-
puting the (modified) edit probability is O(n5/2)=O((r1+r2)2.5) if the space
reduction method from Section 5 is used. According to the available com-
putational resources, systematic experiments were conducted for n [ 2000,
but the obtained false alarm probability estimates were not sufficiently
small in order to produce reliable estimates of a and b. This implies that the
parameter b is close to 1, so that the multiplicative constant in (28) will be
moderately large.
The number of obtained candidate initial state pairs for LFSR1 and
LFSR2 cannot be reduced to just one by increasing the length n if the
threshold is computed according to a given pm, because the initial states
generating relatively small (positive or negative) phase shifts of the original
LFSR sequences give rise to the normalized edit probability values that are
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also close to being maximal. This can be explained by the recursion (15),
which changes only for small s for a negative phase shift (delay) or for s
close to n for a positive phase shift, and remains nearly the same for most
values of s. Therefore, relatively small phase shifts of the original sequence
are not well modeled by the hypothesis H 1 (independent case). Conse-
quently, we obtain a relatively small number of candidate initial state pairs
for LFSR1 and LFSR2 in time O(2r1+r2+2.5 log2(r1+r2)) where the multiplicative
constant is expected to be moderately large.
In the final stage of the attack, the correct initial state pair is identified
along with the correct LFSR3 initial state. For each candidate initial state
pair, all possible LFSR3 initial states are tested by generating the output
sequence and comparing it with the known keystream sequence. If no
match is found, then the candidate initial state pair is discarded. The time
complexity of this stage is O(2r3). In view of the fact that the next-state
function of the A5-type keystream generator is not one-to-one, it is argued
in [6] that several different LFSR initial state triples may give rise to the
same output sequence, so that the solution for the LFSR initial states may
not be unique. In any case, the number of (equivalent) solutions is small
and all of them can easily be obtained from any one of them by the
branching method [6].
If r3 > r1+r2, then the time complexity of the final stage may be reduced
by a more sophisticated method based on the edit distance for one inde-
pendent binary clock-control string (modified to reduce the space com-
plexity). Namely, for each candidate initial state pair, compute this edit
distance and discard the pair if it differs from zero (the zero value indicates
that the pair is consistent with the given output string). Also, store the
whole array of the partial edit distances and then recover all the strings
Um+2 and Rm+1 that are, together with the candidate input strings, consis-
tent with the given output string of length m. This can be achieved by
backtracking through the array following the minimum edit distance paths
when decreasing s. By employing the fact that Rm+1 can be derived from
Um+y
−
3
y
−
3
by stop/go clocking, one can thus reconstruct the segments
composed of the last r3 effectively used bits of all the consistent strings
Um+y
−
3
y
−
3
(m \ 4r3/3). Since the number of such segments should be (much)
smaller than 2 r3, the exhaustive search over all the LFSR3 initial states is
thus avoided.
7. CONCLUSIONS
It is pointed out that the stop/go clocking in the A5-type keystream
generator can be viewed as a random edit transformation of two input
strings into one output binary string. The input strings correspond to the
output sequences of any two LFSRs when regularly clocked, and the
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output string corresponds to the first derivative of the keystream sequence.
The output sequence of the remaining LFSR and an additionally intro-
duced binary clock-control string are assumed to be independent and
purely random. The related edit probability and edit distance are then
defined. Recursive algorithms for their computation are derived. Similar
results are obtained for an edit transformation where the 4-valued clock-
control string is assumed to be purely random.
It is shown how the edit probability can be used to mount a statistically
optimal correlation attack on any two LFSRs, of lengths r1 and r2, respec-
tively. By considering the underlying statistical hypotheses testing problem,
it is argued that the minimum output sequence length required to be known
for a successful attack is linear in r1+r2. The time complexity of the attack
is then O(2r1+r2+2.5 log2(r1+r2)), where the multiplicative constant is expected
to be moderately large. Therefore, a divide-and-conquer effect is achievable
only if the length of the longest LFSR is not relatively small.
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